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European Model of Sport: Alternative Structures 
 
Dr. Katarina Pijetlovic 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
European model of sport is traditionally described as monopolistic pyramid, with one 
federation per sport and per country. In this system, national federations organise competitions, 
promote, and regulate their sport at their respective national levels. They operate under the 
umbrella of a single European and a single global federation that sit at the apex of the pyramid. 
Amateur, semi-professional and professional athletes and clubs are at the bottom of the 
pyramid. They are members of their respective national federations and participate in various 
leagues according to their sporting achievements. It must, however, be emphasised that there 
is no uniform organisational structure of the European sports: the architecture of different 
sports corresponds to this broad pyramid description to various degrees. 
 
Sports governing bodies have an extensive mandate to regulate their discipline. They pass the 
rules concerning the access to competitions, take care of the disciplinary and integrity matters, 
guarantee the uniform rules of the game, ensure the rules for safety at events are in place, 
promote their sport at all levels, etc. At the same time, they are also commercial actors with 
economic interests in the sport they regulate. In their role as organisers of competitions, they 
enter into a number of business deals to sell merchandise, tickets, hospitality packages, media 
and other commercial rights in sporting events. This intermingling of regulatory and 
commercial functions in a single body inevitably leads to a conflict of interests, and often 
causes a detriment to actual or potential competitors on the relevant market. For example, 
sports federations strive to maintain monopoly via the market restrictions in their statutes and 
other rulebooks designed to prevent the emergence of a rival, or make difficult the operation 
of an existing competitor, on the organisational market for sporting events. In doing so, they 
commit antitrust infringements under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
 
It is an interesting time to be writing about the legal issues involved in such restrictions. In 
2016 the EU Commission issued a Statement of Objections in ISU, the first case after Meca-
Medina that addresses this question, and cross-complaints were filed between the international 
and European basketball federations, and private promoter of basketball competitions. A wave 
of recent decisions by national enforcers of EU competition law clarified the TFEU 
requirements applicable to regulation of organisational markets by the sporting associations. 
Under a general rule that expectedly emerged from this line of decisions, any clause preventing 
a possibility of entry and expansion in the market for organisation of sporting events will be 
considered restrictive of competition, unless it can be justified by reference to regulatory or 
commercial ancillarity. These labels imply that a reason for restriction can be legitimately 
attributed to either public interest objectives or to legitimate commercial goals, and that in 
imposing such restrictions the principle of proportionality is respected. As a matter of law, if a 
restriction designation cannot be avoided under ancillary restraints doctrine, in some cases a 
respondent might be able to rely on economic efficiency arguments. Before moving on to 
provide details of this legal framework and the applicable case-law, this chapter will outline 
policy changes towards the traditional pyramid structure in European sports, and argue that this 
model is not a part of ‘specificity of sport’ with regard to organisational aspects.  
 
2. EU policy on the European model of sport  
 In 1998 the Commission published a consultation document that said: ‘[t]here is a European 
model of sport with its own characteristics. […]Sport in Europe has a unique structure. For the 
future development of sport in Europe these special features should be taken into account’.1 
This document rejected the free market model for the future of European sport, resisting the 
pressures of ‘Americanisation’ which is seen as the ultimate evil of excessive commercialism 
leading to destruction of European sporting values, the only true sporting values.2 In the 
Opinion given by the Committee of Regions on ‘The European Model of Sport’, the American 
model is centred too much on a business and market-oriented approach to sport making a clear 
distinction between professional and amateur sport and giving them totally separate structures. 
The Committee of Regions retained its faith in, and asserted its preference for, the European 
socio-cultural model. It further emphasised the special characteristics of the European model 
and said that the inclusion of an economic factor should not be allowed to jeopardise traditional 
values.3 A political consensus regarding the need to preserve the structures of sport in Europe 
was apparent also in other policy documents, notably in the 1999 Commission Helsinki Report 
with a view to safeguarding the current sports structures. This Report also considered that the 
inclination of certain sporting operators and large clubs to leave the federations in order to reap 
the maximum economic benefit from the sport for themselves alone was symptomatic of 
several phenomena: the rise in popularity and internationalisation of sport, and the 
unprecedented development in the economic dimension of sport.4 The Nice Declaration notes 
the developments in the world of sport, but considers that federations must continue to be the 
key feature of a form of organisation providing a guarantee of sporting cohesion and 
participatory democracy, and that ties of solidarity binding the practice of sport at every level 
must be preserved.5 The 2007 Parliament Report on the future of professional football in 
Europe (Committee on Culture and Education) noted in a similar spirit that ‘European sport, 
and football in particular, is an inalienable part of the European identity, European culture and 
citizenship, and the European Football Model, characterised by open sports competitions 
within a pyramid structure in which several hundred thousand amateur clubs and millions of 
volunteers and players form the base for the top professional clubs […]’ and identified the 
growing concentration of economic wealth and sports power as a threat to the future of 
professional football in Europe. It stressed ‘its attachment to the European Football Model, 
with its symbiotic relationship between amateur and professional football’6 The Amsterdam 
Declaration on Sport7 similarly centred on the social significance of sport. These policy 
statements are based on the desire to preserve fundamental values such as the societal role of 
‘sport for all’, self-regulation, and solidarity between professional and amateur levels, as well 
as the highly beneficial effects that sports have on youth, health and social inclusion policies.8 
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The Commissioner responsible for EU competition policy addressed the question of a single 
federation per sport in 2001, and acknowledged that ‘[w]hile the existence of a single federation 
overseeing both the regulatory and organisational aspects of a sport is common in Europe […] 
other scenarios exist or can be envisaged.’9 This signalled a move in the articulation of sports 
policy away from the prevalent socio-cultural approach towards a more economic-based 
approach, to be set out in the Commission’s 2007 White Paper on Sport.10 The Commission 
Staff Working Paper annexed to the White Paper saw the relevance of the pyramid structure 
for both the organisation of competitions and sport in general as ‘greatly reduced’.11 The 
Commission first repeated the previous policy statements on the pyramid structure and labelled 
certain values and traditions of European sport as worthy of support. But then it went on to 
recognise the diversity and complexities of European sport structures which make it unrealistic 
to try and define a single organisational model of sport in Europe.12 Garcia saw this as the 
Commission’s withdrawal of an important element of the political debate, which it did partly 
because the pyramid model has been politicized and used in arguments by governing bodies, 
such as IOC, UEFA and FIFA, to further their own agenda, and avoid the legal intervention by 
public authorities and legitimacy challenges by other stakeholders, such as clubs and athletes.13 
The White Paper further acknowledged that ‘[n]ew tendencies are challenging the traditional 
vision of a unified ‘European Sport Model’.14 These challenges to the organisational structures 
are the increasing commercialisation and the emergence of new stakeholders outside the sports 
(such as aspiring private promoters) and inside the sports (such as FIFPro, ECA, and EPFL in 
football). This supplied another reason for the shift from policy that strongly supported vertical 
pyramid model to the appreciation of the necessity for a decentralised model that might be 
more appropriate given the prevailing empirical reality.  
 
3. Is European model of sport a part of Article 165(1) TFEU ‘specificity of sport’ concept? 
 
The ‘specificity of sport’ is the concept that refers to the inherent characteristics of sport which 
set it apart from other economic and social activities.15 It has never been set in absolute terms 
by the Court as its original creator and, as emphasised in the Commission Staff Working 
Document, its application is always assessed on a case-by-case basis.16 The Lisbon Treaty 
amendments that entered into force on 1 December 2009 provided constitutional basis to the 
concept of ‘specificity of sport’. Article 165(1) TFEU states that ‘[t]he Union shall contribute 
to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of 
sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function’. The 
study on the Lisbon Treaty and European Union Sports Policy commissioned by the European 
Parliament concluded that Article 165(1) TFEU will add little further protection for contested 
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sports rules beyond those already provided by the Court and the Commission because the two 
institutions have already been highly receptive to the ‘specific nature of sport’ concept.17 
The 2011 Commission Communication on Developing European Dimension in Sport interprets 
the ‘specificity of sport’ referred to in Article 165 TFEU as the concept encompassing ‘all the 
characteristics that make sport special, such as for instance the interdependence between 
competing adversaries or the pyramid structure of open competitions’.18 This quote does not 
say anything about organisational model or governance of sport, as it is perfectly possible to 
have vertical structure of competition with central regulatory authority without vertical 
structure of organisational market. What it does imply is that promotion and relegation with a 
single European champion per sport are a part of ‘specificity of sport’ concept in Article 165 
TFEU. In economic theory, it is a peculiarity of professional sport production that 
championships must possess a monopoly status to achieve consistent ranking and increase their 
value for consumers.19 So all that the Communication emphasised is the need to take this into 
account in the application of the EU economic provisions. Aspects of ‘specificity of sport’ 
concept thus taken into account will not necessarily prevail in the balancing act against 
economic aspects in a potential dispute. The quote also suggests that closed leagues would be 
opposed to specific nature of European sport within the meaning of Article 165(1) TFEU, and 
would not be able to benefit for it. However, the EU will not directly impose any particular 
organisational model on any sport, because each sport has its specificities and deserves to be 
treated accordingly.20 
  
4. Restrictions on alternative sports organisers: analysis under EU competition law 
 
The relevant market for provision of organisational services is attractive for prospective 
entrants because it automatically enables access to one of the connected markets: the 
downstream market for commercial exploitation. This primarily includes sales of broadcasting 
and other media rights, but also product licensing, ticketing, sponsorship, merchandising, etc. 
In MOTOE the Court defined the relevant market as consisting in ‘first, the organisation of 
motorcycling events and, second, in their commercial exploitation’.21 Those two types of 
activities were seen as functionally complementary. Being the sole organisers enables 
governing bodies to have the exclusivity over commercial exploitation. The market for services 
of athletes and/or clubs represents the upstream market. Governing bodies regulate the labour 
market and player mobility, they engage in club licensing, and control other factors of 
production of the sporting product: the game.  
 
There are three main ways that sports governing bodies restrict or prevent the emergence of a 
new competitor on the market for organisational services. The first way is to insert clauses in 
their statutes and other rulebooks that render the access to that market a subject to prior 
authorisation, but in practice make it excessively difficult to obtain such authorisation. This 
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has thus far been the case in many sports, including European football. Articles 49 (1) and (3) 
of the UEFA Statutes confer the sole jurisdiction on UEFA to organize or abolish international 
competitions in Europe in which Member Associations and/or their clubs participate. Any 
international matches, competitions or tournaments which are not organized by the UEFA, but 
are played on UEFA territory, shall require the prior approval of FIFA and/or UEFA and/or the 
relevant Member Association(s).22 This way of controlling access to market and making it 
subject to prior authorisation is not objectionable per se. It is after all a legitimate mandate of 
the governing bodies to act on behalf of entire sporting community and protect public interests 
in their respective disciplines. Not exercising the necessary degree of supervision and leaving 
regulation of sport to multiple private operators would clearly not be in the interest of sport. In 
internal market cases the systems subjecting the marketing of goods and services to a prior 
authorisation procedure are justified if they pursue a public interest objective and comply with 
the principle of proportionality.23 In Canal Satélite Digital the Court specified that in 
determining whether a system of ex ante control complies with the principle of proportionality, 
it is important to consider: whether a system is based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria 
which are known in advance so that the regulatory power is not used arbitrarily; whether a 
system duplicates the control already carried out; whether subsequent control system would be 
too late to be genuinely effective to attain the aim pursued, and; whether on account of its 
duration and the disproportionate cost it deters the operators concerned from pursuing their 
business plan.24 Similar considerations apply in competition law: transparent, objective, fair, 
non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria directed at pursuing public interest goals will be 
accepted as legitimate.25 In Metro the restrictions in a selective distribution scheme were held 
to fall outside of Article 101(1) TFEU where they satisfy objective qualitative criteria and are 
applied in non-discriminatory manner.26 This is an example of ancillary restraint doctrine based 
on legitimate commercial objectives. So it is not the existence of the system of prior approval 
that can breach the competition provisions, but the precise drafting of the criteria and the way 
it is applied in practice. 
The second way that governing bodies restrict the emergence of a new competitor on the market 
for organisational services is to control factors of production needed to stage a competition, 
such as imposing sanctions on athletes, clubs, and leagues for taking part in the rival event. For 
example, in ISU case, International Skating Union (ISU) threatened their athletes with a 
lifetime ban if they take part in any non-sanctioned event.27 Clauses such as this successfully 
prevent any private promoter to enter or expand in the market for organisation of events that 
compete with that of a governing body. A recent study that included 19 sports disciplines 
outlined sanctions faced by athletes for participating in events not authorized by their 
international sports federation.28 
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The third way is to draft their contract with broadcasters and sponsors in such way as to block 
the competitor in the exploitation market or make that market commercially unattractive. This 
was the case in FIA/Formula One.29 The private promoters of grand prix had a clause in their 
contracts preventing circuits used for Formula One races from being used for races which could 
compete with Formula One, while the agreements with broadcasters contained a financial 
penalty of up to 50% of the price paid, if they televised anything deemed to be a competitive 
threat to Formula One.   
 
The core of the methodological approach in assessing whether a regulatory rule adopted by a 
sports association for protection of public interest objectives infringes Articles 101 and/or 102 
TFEU comprises the analytical framework provided by the Meca-Medina judgement.30 
According to that judgement  
[n]ot every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings 
which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within 
the prohibition laid down in Article [101(1) TFEU]. For the purposes of application of that 
provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which 
the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, more 
specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects 
restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives (Wouters and Others, 
paragraph 97) and are proportionate to them.31  
A rule that passes this test will be considered an ancillary restraint, i.e., a restriction on 
competition that is directly related and objectively necessary for the implementation of the 
main non-restrictive transaction and is proportionate to it. As such, it will fall outside of the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.32 Regulatory ancillarity33 of this kind was first introduced by 
the CJEU in Wouters34 and repeated in Meca-Medina, and was so far applied only in cases of 
regulatory restrictions imposed by collective private bodies in the public interest. The Meca-
Medina analytical framework does not apply to the restrictive rules of associations adopted for 
the protection of their private commercial interests. However, provided that such restrictive 
rules are directly related and objectively necessary for the implementation of the main, non-
restrictive transaction and are proportionate to it, the rule would be considered legitimate under 
analytically very similar ‘commercial ancillarity’ doctrine under Article 101(1) TFEU. 
Restraints on competition that were ancillary to a legitimate commercial purpose were 
exemplified in DLG case discussed below in Section XXX.35 The exemption would have to be 
sought under Article 101(3) TFEU and the efficiency defence under Article 102 TFEU. 
 
Proportionate rules conferring monopoly on the sports federations in regards to certain matters 
of regulatory competence present less controversy in application of this framework. Those 
matters are probably best be left to the governing bodies who can legitimately insist that 
provisions pertaining to, for example, refereeing, disciplinary matters, independence of clubs, 
integrity and anti-doping must be included in the regulation of alternative competitions. The 
Commission acknowledged that consistency of sporting regulations and rules of the game can 
                                                          
29 See Section x below for details of the case.  
30 Commission Staff Working Document, op.cit. fn. X, para 2.1.2.  
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be achieved only by applicability of uniform, centrally drafted rules.36 Matters of integrity, 
such as anti-corruption codes, anti-doping policies, or disciplinary matters are likely to 
constitute inherent rules in EU sports law, and are therefore best left to the competence of 
governing bodies in charge of their sport, subject to the proportionality principle. They should 
not be entrusted to clubs and private promoters as undertakings interested in private gain as 
opposed to safeguarding public interest. Advocate General Kokott similarly saw the uniformity 
of these rules as enabling participants to compare their performances, which would not be that 
easy if rules varied greatly from one organiser to another. Without them, in her Opinion, the 
public’s interest and the recognition of the sport might suffer.37 The licensing system for clubs 
in general was listed as an example of a sporting rule unlikely to infringe the EU competition 
provisions in the Commission Staff Working Document.38 Ensuring the financial stability of 
sport clubs/teams is seen as one of the objective justifications, as it relates to the organisation 
and proper conduct of competitive sport.39 According to the Commission, licensing systems 
generally aim to ensure that all clubs respect the same basic rules on financial management and 
transparency, but could also include provisions regarding discrimination, violence, protection 
of minors and training. In Piau, the General Court accepted that FIFA regulations on a 
mandatory licensing system for football agents could contribute to economic progress by 
protecting football players, members of a sporting profession with short playing careers.40 In 
its draft preliminary guidelines on the Application of Competition Rules to Sport of 15 
February 1999, the European Commission agreed with the International Rugby Board that 
control over the official match calendar by a governing body is necessary for the good of the 
game, ensuring solidarity and development of sport at the grassroots level, matters which 
individual clubs, if allowed to act in their own self-interest, are unlikely to take into account.41 
Control over the official event calendar is not only necessary to ensure regulatory integrity and 
a proper balance between different events. It also ensures that certain revenues are generated 
not just for the elite at the top of the pyramid but also for the benefit of football as a whole, as 
the competitive playing base of the pyramid would shrink without such solidarity.42  
 
The situation is more difficult when it comes to governing bodies attempts to maintain 
monopoly over other issues, such as the organisation and commercial exploitation of sporting 
events. Conflation of regulatory and commercial functions in one body necessarily leads to 
conflict of interest and as such will always be carefully scrutinised. The Commission 
considered rules shielding sports associations from competition as a prime examples of 
sporting rules that may infringe completion provision.43 Thus, when a sporting federation 
adopts rules that lead to foreclosure in the organisational market, or that make it excessively 
difficult to enter or operate in that market, it will always amount to, at the very least, prima 
facie restriction on competition under the Meca-Medina test (the examples of three main ways 
that this may occur was outlined above in this section). That test provides that when a public 
interest accepted as legitimate is at the heart of the reason for restriction on commercial activity, 
the challenged rule will be further examined for its proportionality. The rules placing 
restrictions on alternative organisers that are not backed up by public interest objectives, that 
rely on them only as a mask for private commercial goals, or that are not connected to 
                                                          
36 Developing the European Dimension in Sport, op.cit. fn. X, para 4.2.  
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42 Ibid. 
43 Commission Staff Working Paper, para 2.2.2.1., op.cit. fn x. 
‘specificity of sport’, will be assessed under the standard competition law framework, and 
Meca-Medina will not be applicable. These rules may be exempted on the basis of commercial 
ancillarity under Article 101(1) TFEU, or economic efficiency exemption under Articles 
101(3) and 102 TFEU.  
 
The Commission in its Staff Working Document specifies that the legitimate objectives of 
sporting rules will normally relate to the ‘organisation and proper conduct of competitive 
sport’.44 It lists a number of public interest goals that have so far been accepted as legitimate 
in the sports-related jurisprudence of the Court and Commission decisional practice. They 
include the ensuring of fair sport competitions with equal chances for all athletes, the ensuring 
of uncertainty of results, the protection of the athletes’ health and the safety of spectators, the 
encouragement of training of young athletes, the ensuring of financial stability of sport 
clubs/teams or the ensuring of a uniform and consistent exercise of a given sport.45 The 
Commission also emphasised that ‘specificity of sport’ will be taken into consideration when 
assessing the existence of a legitimate objective. Accordingly, in sports where lower tiers of 
competition and grassroots are reliant on the mechanisms of financial solidarity, the governing 
bodies of such sports can legitimately require a part of the profits from the alternative events 
to be transferred for the benefit of lower tiers of the game. Richer clubs participating in 
prestigious competitions usually depend on harvesting young talents and players developed by 
the less well-off clubs and leagues. Keeping those lower tiers financially afloat is important 
both for the game and to preserve their socio-cultural contribution, and it would not be 
sustainable to have private promoters free-ride on their developmental efforts. Financial 
solidarity can also be used as a mechanisms of competitive balance, the maintenance of which 
was held as legitimate objective in Bosman.46 Additionally, financial solidarity is one of those 
public policy objectives that can be repackaged as an economic efficiency argument under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. When UEFA notified its joint selling arrangements to the Commission, 
it relied on financial solidarity as a justification for exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. It 
submitted and the Commission accepted, that its financial solidarity model supports the 
development of European football by ensuring a fairer distribution of revenues. Commission 
considered on the basis of well-established case law that a solidarity model improves 
production and stimulates the development of the sport and emphasised that it is in favour of 
the financial solidarity principle.47 
Whether or not particular financial contributions required from the alternative organisers will 
pass the competition test ultimately depends on their proportionality. This is the very core of 
Meca-Medina analytical framework that usually determines the outcome and requires a case-
by-case approach. It is important to remember when carrying out proportionality assessment 
that sometimes rules that are not restrictive enough can be a cause for infringement, as much 
as rules that are overly restrictive.48 The cases discussed below in this chapter will highlight 
the approach of the courts and the competition authorities at both EU and the Member State 
level in various factual contexts pertaining to restrictions on alternative competitions. 
 
5. Competition law breaches by alternative structures 
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The issue of breakaway and alternative structures is usually approached from the point of view 
of restrictions on rival organisers by one of the three methods outlines above in Section xxx. 
But it should not be assumed that rival organisers are free from claims under Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU. While tendering the media rights, drafting contracts with investors and 
broadcasters, designing the league structure, or running already established alternative 
competition, they are susceptible to committing as many competition law infringements as the 
governing body itself. The FIBA case against Euroleague Commercial Assets (ECA) testifies 
to this.49 For example, access to the alternative league for clubs and athletes should be based 
on objective, clearly defined, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria. It would be hard to 
legally defend any closed league structure if challenged by the aspiring entrant or the 
federations concerned.50 The league that consists of all European elite clubs will likely give a 
rise to a collectively dominant position held by those clubs, and a dominant position as regards 
the organiser of such league.51 As such, these undertakings should not allow their conduct to 
impede the competitive structure on the market. It should be kept in mind that every assessment 
of competition issues is very dependent on the facts of the case, structure of the market and 
characteristics of the sport concerned.  
6. EU case law 
 
6.1. Case C-49/07 MOTOE [2008]  
 
So far, there exist only three cases that raised related issues to, and provided limited guidance 
for evaluating clauses in the sports governing bodies’ rulebooks preventing or restricting the 
establishment of rival structures. MOTOE52 concerned Articles 102 and 106(1) TFEU in the 
context of the organisation and regulation of motorcycling in Greece. Addressed to the EU 
Member States, Article 106(1) TFEU applies to state measures of a regulatory nature which 
are directed at activities of an economic nature. It does not have an independent application 
because it is a reference provision which can be applied only in conjunction with other TFEU 
articles. The rationale behind Article 106(1) TFEU is that a Member State may be held liable 
for the breaches of the Treaty by undertakings when the monopoly held by an undertaking is 
statutory.  
The dispute arose over Article 49 of the Greek Road Traffic Code that conferred exclusive 
power on ELPA (Automobile and Touring Club of Greece) to grant consents for the 
organisation of motorcycling events in Greece, necessary to get license from the competent 
ministry. ELPA was itself organising the same kinds of events in Greece. MOTOE (Greek 
Motorcycling Federation) was refused the consent from ELPA for no apparent reason and 
therefore failed to obtain license. According to MOTOE, this refusal by ELPA amounted to 
abuse of its monopolistic position.  
The mere creation or reinforcement of a dominant position through the grant of special or 
exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 106(1) TFEU was not in itself considered 
incompatible with Article 102 TFEU. The key question was the discretion that a Member State 
left for the regulatory bodies to abuse the conferred powers. Should an undertaking be under 
an obligation to engage in abusive practices, the Member State is responsible for the abuses 
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that take place, and conversely, if an undertaking has discretion not to abuse its special powers 
the Member State will not be held responsible for the committed abuses.53 
The Court will consider Article 106(1), in conjunction with Article 102, breached where the 
dominant position creates the mere possibility and circumstances which can lead the 
undertaking to commit an abuse. The concept of abuse in this context is interpreted expansively 
to include creating ‘a risk of an abuse of a dominant position’. This is more reminiscent of the 
approach to oligopolistic markets, or to substantive assessment of concentrations, than it is to 
the well-established approach to Article 102 TFEU alone under which abuse has to take place 
in order to find violation. On the facts of the case, ELPA was itself organizing and 
commercially exploiting motorcycling events, and in addition was in charge of giving consent 
to other undertakings to organise and commercially exploit motorcycling events. These 
different powers placed ELPA in apparent advantage over its competitors whereby it could 
restrict access to the relevant market for the other operators.54 The final word of the Court on 
the conflict of interests between regulatory and commercial functions created by the state was 
that a combination of Articles 106(1) and 102 TFEU precludes:  
[...]a national rule which confers on a legal person, which organises motorcycling 
events and enters, in that connection, into sponsorship, advertising and insurance 
contracts, the power to give consent to applications for authorisation to organise such 
competitions, without that power being made subject to restrictions, obligations and 
review.55 
On the facts of this case there was no such control placed upon ELPA. Miettinen concludes 
that MOTOE provides basis to argue that since all undertakings that are endowed with 
regulatory powers are merely placed in a dominant position must be subject to ‘restrictions, 
obligations and review.’56 Weatherill similarly suggested that giving exclusive rights which 
lead to conflict of interests is not a problem in itself, as long as sporting federations thus 
endowed have ‘transparent, objectively justified, and non-discriminatory procedures and 
criteria for selection which are followed faithfully and openly’, and the applicant promoter is 
afforded a right to a hearing and given reasons for decisions taken, which should be reviewable 
by an independent body.57 Interestingly, long before MOTOE, the competition authority in 
Finland (Kilpailuvirasto) cautioned the Finnish Basketball Association that it had to exercise 
its market position and influence over the sport responsibly, and that its decisions had to be 
clearly reasoned and made in a transparent and timely manner.58 
 
6.2. Commission investigation in FIA/Formula One case  
 
Another case concerning the conflict of interest between the regulatory and commercial 
functions of a sport association involved the Fédération Internationale d’Automobile (FIA), 
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the international association for motor sport. FIA was the organiser and promoter of motor 
sport championships, including Formula One.59 It issued licences to any party wishing to take 
part in international motor sport events authorised by FIA, including track owners, vehicle 
manufacturers, organisers of motor sport events and drivers. License holders were allowed to 
organise or enter only those events authorised by FIA. Entering or organising events not 
authorised by FIA would mean the loss of their license and the virtual end of any commercial 
activity in motor sport. This way, FIA was able to control everyone and everything needed 
stage a rival championship that could compete with FIA’s events. The Commission found 
evidence that the competing GTR Organisation was forced out of the market by these rules, 
and its GTR series was replaced by the FIA GT Championship. Further, FIA claimed the 
television rights to all events incorporating the FIA name into their title, which were then 
transferred to International Sportsworld Communicators (ISC). It also forced the Formula One 
teams by the terms of tripartite Concorde Agreement to assign to it all broadcasting rights in 
the Formula One championship, which it then transferred to Formula One Administration Ltd 
(FOA), a commercial rights holder. The same agreement also prevented Formula One teams 
from racing in any other series comparable to Formula One for a very long period of time. The 
promoters’ rights were taken directly by FOA which has been given the power by the FIA to 
determine who can and cannot be a promoter of a grand prix. The promoters’ contracts 
prevented circuits used for Formula One races from being used for races which could compete 
with Formula One, while the agreements with broadcasters placed a massive financial penalty, 
ranging from between 33% to 50% of the price paid, if they televised anything deemed by FOA 
to be a competitive threat to Formula One.60 
In 1999, the Commission issued a Statement of Objections. It came to the preliminary 
conclusion that the rules described were contrary to Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU as they gave 
FIA the control to block the organisation of races which competed with the events FIA 
promoted or organised. The Commission also objected to certain terms of the contracts between 
the FOA and broadcasters because they made it possible to block the organisation of motor 
sport events that would compete with Formula One races. Finally, the Commission objected to 
FIA rules according to which FIA automatically acquired TV rights to all the motor sport events 
it authorises even if these were promoted by a different promoter. The core of all of the 
objections is the conflict between the FIA’s legitimate role as the regulator of international 
motor sport and its interests in the commercial side of motor sport.61 
In 2001 the Commission closed the case62 after reaching a settlement with FIA’s president Max 
Mosley, and CEO of FOA, Bernie Ecclestone. The settlement provided that FIA would remove 
conflict of interest by limiting itself to a role of sport regulator without influence over the 
commercial exploitation; enable access to the market and factors of production (teams and 
circuit owners) to rival organisations provided they meet safety standards; waive its TV rights 
or transfer them to the promoters concerned; and remove the anticompetitive clauses from the 
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agreements between FOA and broadcasters.63 In 2003 the Commission ended the monitoring 
of compliance with the 2001 settlement.64 
 
Unlike in MOTOE, in FIA/Formula One there was no element of state involvement, as the 
powers which enabled it to control the relevant markets were not endowed by an act of public 
authority but by its own rules and web of private agreements. The safeguard against unjustified 
refusal of licenses in the FIA/Formula One case was the obligation to insert a new clause 
ensuring that legal challenge against FIA decisions would be available not only within their 
structure but also before national courts. Both MOTOE and FIA/Formula One cases involved 
sporting bodies protecting private interests, rather than acting on behalf of public interests in 
general. Neither of the cases involved ‘specificity of sport’ in any form. This made them 
imperfect precedents for the standard type of restrictive rules on alternative establishments. 
 
6.3. Case C-250/92 DLG  
 
The closest analogy is supplied by the DLG case decided in 1994 in the context of agriculture.65 
DLG was a cooperative purchasing association established in order to pursue common 
commercial objectives for its members, as opposed to public interest objectives relied on by 
sporting federations under Meca-Medina test. It held 36% of the relevant market share, which 
is to be contrasted with virtual monopolies held by sports governing bodies. DLG was 
permitted to place a restriction on their members’ participation in alternative agricultural 
cooperatives, on the basis that the restriction in fact benefited competition and was necessary 
to protect legitimate goals necessary for the functioning of the cooperative. The Court said that 
in a market where product prices vary according to the volume of orders, the activities of 
cooperative purchasing associations may, relative to the size of their membership, constitute a 
significant counterweight to the contractual power of large producers and bring about more 
effective competition in some markets.66 A dual membership in competing cooperatives would 
jeopardize both the proper functioning of the cooperative and its contractual power in relation 
to producers making each association less capable to pursue its objectives. In this sense, 
prohibition of dual membership does not necessarily constitute a restriction of competition and 
may even have beneficial effects on competition.67 On the other hand, the prohibition also have 
adverse effects on competition because they restrict the opportunity for members to join other 
types of competing cooperatives and thus discourage them from obtaining supplies 
elsewhere.68 The Court held that the statutes of a cooperative purchasing association, 
forbidding its members to participate in other forms of organised cooperation which are in 
direct competition with it, are not caught by the prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU and do not 
amount to abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU, so long as they are restricted 
to what is necessary to ensure the achievement of the legitimate commercial objectives. In 
DLG, this meant the proper functioning of the cooperative and ensuring its contractual power 
in relation to producers.69  On the facts of the case it did not appear that prohibition on dual 
membership went beyond what was necessary to ensure that the said objectives are met. First, 
the restrictions covered only the farm supplies in respect of which there existed a direct 
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relationship between sales volume and price.70 Second, non-members of DLG, including the 
plaintiffs, were free to make any purchases from it on the same commercial terms and at the 
same prices as members, except that ‘non-members’ were not entitled to annual discount on 
the amount of the transactions carried out.71 Finally, DLG’s statutes authorize its members to 
buy fertilizers and plant protection products without using DLG as an intermediary, provided 
that such transactions are carried out otherwise than through an organised consortium.72  
In DLG, much like in the subsequent Wouters and Meca-Medina judgments, the Court made it 
clear that a restriction on commercial freedom is not the same as a restriction on commercial 
freedom that restricts competition. The aims of EU competition law and policy are centred on 
the preservation of free competition and do not contain guarantees on unfettered commercial 
conduct of the all the parties. In fact, the success of many pro-competitive agreements depends 
on the ability to restrict conduct of some of the parties. The judgment in DLG is often referred 
to as a precursor to Wouters, a case that supplied the core analytical framework to Meca-
Medina. This means that even those restrictive rules on alternative leagues that do not have 
public policy objectives might be able to benefit from similar analysis in Article 101(1) TFEU 
provided that the restrictions are necessary for the attainment of legitimate commercial goals.  
 
6.4. ISU case before the European Commission 
 
The first time that the EU institutions had an opportunity to deal directly with the governing 
bodies’ clauses restricting the participation in alternative sporting events was in the ISU case 
that is currently awaiting final decision before the EU Commission.73 ISU is recognised as a 
governing body and a sole regulator of the sports of figure skating and speed skating on ice by 
the International Olympic Committee. The facts of the case go back to December 2011 when 
a private promoter, Icederby International, informed ISU that it intended to organise an 
alternative international speed skating event with innovative competition format that combined 
short and long track skating. The ISU reacted by revising its Code of Ethics in January 2012 
that included Article 4(h), a clause forbidding participation “in all forms of betting or support 
betting or gambling related to any event/activity under the jurisdiction of the ISU.” As per ISU 
Communication No. 1717, the Code of Ethics, including its Article 4(h), applied to the widest 
range of individuals. In addition to the customary list of covered persons such as ISU officials, 
skaters, coaches, doctors, employees, consultants, members and their members, also volunteers 
at ISU events and ISU-sanctioned Member events, and all other persons who engage in any 
activity in relation to the ISU that is prohibited by the Code of Ethics, were covered.74 On the 
basis of this article ISU refused to sanction Icederby event that was to take place in October 
2014 in Dubai, even though it is a jurisdiction in which betting activities were strictly 
prohibited.75  
 
Dubai race had a dedicated sum of EUR 1.4 million in prize money and it would have paid a 
minimum of $37.650 and a maximum of $130.000 to any skater merely taking part in it. In 
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comparison, a long-track speed skater could earn as much as $109.000, and a short-track skater 
$31.900 in a season from ISU competitions.76 However, ice speed skaters were subject to two 
rules that made the prize money at Dubai event (and any other non-sanctioned competition) 
unattainable: Rule 102 (2) (ii) of the ISU General Regulations that made any person skating or 
officiating in a non-sanctioned event ineligible to participate in events organised by ISU, and 
Rule 102 (7) that provided for a possibility of a lifetime ban from all ISU competitions, 
including Winter Olympics and the World and European Championships (Rule 102(3)). ISU 
reiterated in its Communication No. 1853 that these eligibility rules will be enforced against 
any skaters or officials that take part in Dubai event.  
Under the threat of a lifetime ban no skater would agree to participate in any of the non-
sanctioned events. As a consequence of this, an alternative organiser, such as Icederby 
International, would be unsuccessful in its attempts to enter or expand in the market for 
organisation of ice speed-skating events. Top athletes represent the main factor for staging 
commercially viable competition and the ISU eligibility rules made it virtually impossible to 
acquire them. 
 
The two Dutch ice speed skaters, Mark Tuitert and Niels Kerstholt, saw these rules as a 
restriction on their professional opportunities and filed a competition complaint with the EU 
Commission in June 2014. They alleged that ISU eligibility rules are in breach of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU because a lifelong ban for participation in alternative competition is not inherent 
and proportionate to the pursuit of any legitimate objective, contrary to the requirements of 
Meca-Medina formula. Additional issue from the point of view of skaters that directly and 
manifestly affected their interests were barriers to entry and expansion on the market for the 
organisation of international speed-skating events.77 
On the basis of this complaint the EU Commission opened up formal proceedings against ISU 
on 5th October 2015 to test the disputed clauses against the EU competition law parameters.78 
As a response to this legal challenge the ISU amended its eligibility rules at its Congress in 
June 2016.79 The new Rule 102 (2) of ISU Constitution and General Regulations 201680 
provides that ‘[a] person becomes ineligible to participate in ISU activities and competitions 
by skating or officiating in an International Competition not sanctioned by the ISU’. 
Ineligibility is imposed by the ISU Council according Rule 102 (7) (d) that provides for the 
sliding scale of sanctions ranging from warning to ineligibility for a lifetime. Specifically, it 
provides that ‘ISU Council shall i) issue a warning in case of minor, first time violations; ii) 
impose an ineligibility period for up to five years in case of medium heavy violations and in 
case of repeated minor violations; iii) impose an ineligibility period for up to ten years in case 
of serious violations; iv) impose an ineligibility period up to life time in case of very serious 
violations, especially intentional violations which endanger the integrity and jurisdiction of the 
ISU.’ The applicable sanction shall be determined in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality, meaning that each case will be considered on its own merits. In particular ‘the 
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degree of fault of the offender, his previous record and the seriousness of the violation with 
regard to the objectives of the ISU […], the integrity of the ISU's sports and other legitimate 
interests of the ISU’ play a role in determining the sanctions.81 When taken together with the 
nuanced set of sanctions, it appears that the proportionality is applied only when the offence 
has already been classified as minor, medium, serious, or very serious and prescribed one of 
the applicable range of sanctions. 
The apparent objections to the revised rules that can be raised is that there are no indications 
of what constitutes minor, medium and serious offences. Only the category of ‘very serious 
offence’ was broadly defined in Rule 102(7)(d)(iv) that refers to ‘intentional violations which 
endanger the integrity and jurisdiction of the ISU.’ This can be interpreted to indicate that a 
very long ban or a lifetime ban will be imposed in cases of participation in non-sanctioned 
events, as they are the very activities that directly compromise the integrity and jurisdiction of 
the ISU. As such, the amendments to the ISU eligibility rules appear largely cosmetic and do 
not deal away with the issue of disproportionate sanctions for the skaters taking part in 
unauthorised events. This is surprising given that the reason for which they were introduced 
was to address the concerns raised by the EU Commission when it opened formal proceedings 
in the case. 
 
The Commission implicitly recognised that the amendments to the eligibility rules are 
insufficient to address the competition concerns when it issued a Statement of Objections on 
27 September 2016.82 This is a formal step in antitrust investigation that sets out the position 
of the Commission and gives the respondent an opportunity to be heard before the adoption of 
a binding decision. The Commissioner in charge of the EU competition policy, Margrethe 
Vestager, recognised that international sports governing bodies are responsible for ensuring 
high standard of conduct, the health and safety of athletes and the integrity of competitions. 
She said that the competition concerns in the case are related to the penalties imposed on skaters 
through the ISU eligibility rules because in Commission’s opinion they are not being aimed at 
preserving high standards in sport but rather serve to maintain the ISU's control over speed 
skating. Therefore, in its preliminary view the Commission considered that the penalties restrict 
both the commercial freedom of athletes and the entry to the market for the new organisers of 
international speed skating events. It also indicated that the restrictive clauses will be tested 
under the Meca-Medina framework.83  
 
In its response to the Statement of Objections, the ISU emphasised that independent organizers 
are in fact able to stage international tournaments on the ISU international calendar. In support 
of this claim, they cited recently authorized event in the Netherlands co-organized by Icederby 
International, the private entity which initiated the competition investigation via the two Dutch 
complainants. According to ISU, this furnished a proof rendering unfounded the Commission’s 
claim that alternative organizers are foreclosed from the market.84 
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Indeed, if ISU could prove that the entry to the organisational market is practically possible 
and that any refusal to sanction rival entities is only for ethical and integrity purposes, and/or 
to ensure that health and safety of the skaters are adequately safeguarded, they would be one 
step closer to successfully defending their rules. It will be the proportionality of the chosen 
methods to attain the legitimate objectives that will play an ultimate role in assessing the 
validity of eligibility rules under the TFEU competition provisions. Having said that, a lifetime 
ban for participating in unsanctioned event will extremely unlikely be considered proportionate 
and so will any other sanction or rule that can effectively put an end to athletes’ careers.  
The decision in this case is widely projected to alter the classic landscape of the European 
model of sport. It will supply an important precedent that will sooner or later affect the structure 
of organisational markets in all other sports in Europe, so the influence of the decision extends 
far beyond skating. In the near future football could see an emergence of alternative European 
cross-border league properly sanctioned by both the UEFA and the relevant national 
associations.  
 
6.5. Euroleague Basketball v. FIBA and FIBA Europe and FIBA v Euroleague Commercial 
Assets 
 
These two cases involving cross-complaints are discussed below in Section xxx in the context 
of national proceedings before Munich Regional Court.  
 
7. Alternative leagues in NCAs’ and MS national courts’ decisions 
 
The Commission’s position in the ISU Statement of Objections comes as no surprise given the 
outcomes in the series of cases that took place before the Member States’ national courts and 
national competition authorities in the past few years. The cases discussed in this section 
involve similar restrictions on competition as presented in ISU case, and they replay in various 
form the underlying issues of conflation of regulatory and commercial functions in a single 
governing body. All of the national enforcers took the same line of approach in assessing the 
legality of the restrictive rules in cases decided after Meca-Medina judgement, providing inter 
alia an indication of effectiveness of mechanisms for preserving uniformity in the decentralised 
system of EU competition law enforcement.  
 
7.1. Sweden: SBF v. KKV and IBFF cases 
 
In 2012 and 2014, the Swedish enforcers had an opportunity to rule on two sports cases on 
alternative events under EU competition law. In SBF v. KKV,85 Swedish Automobile Sports 
Federation (SBF, Svenska Bilsportförbundet) responsible for organising automotive sport in 
Sweden challenged the  decision of the Swedish Competition Authority (KKV, 
Konkurrensverket)86 according to which SBF Common Rules forbidding its members from 
participating as drivers and event staff in races not sanctioned by the SBF are contrary to EU 
competition law. In its decision KKV found that the clauses are obviously aimed at preserving 
SBF monopoly, while being harmful to drivers and other interested parties, restricting 
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competition, and inhibiting the development of the automotive sport.87 Swedish Market Court 
(Marknadsdomstolen) confirmed the decision of KKV, and decided on the case without making 
a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the EU.88 It mirrored the approach by the 
KKV and accepted as legitimate the socio-cultural and educational objectives of sport, as well 
as the need to ensure safe competition, but considered the restrictions as disproportionate 
means of attaining those objectives.89 In particular, the SBF failed to convince the Market Court 
that less restrictive means were not available and that the objectives can only be safeguarded 
by the challenges measures which constituted an absolute ban on competition. After the court 
pronounced its judgement, SBF was required to amend its Common Rules and remove the 
clauses preventing their members to take part in unsanctioned automotive events.  
Commenting on the case Lindholm correctly noted that the Market Court was not willing to 
rule on the organisational model of sport as such.90 This approach is consistent with the EU 
policy discussed above in Section xxx that emphasises the autonomy of sport to organise itself 
and refuses to be prescriptive as regards any structural model of sport.  
 
It took only a couple of years before another private promoter relied on SBF v. KKV precedent 
before Swedish Competition Authority. In 2014, BMR Sport Nutrition AB submitted a 
complaint under Article 101 TFEU against the Swedish Bodybuilding and Fitness Federation 
(SKKF), the only national member of International Bodybuilding Federation (IFBB).91 More 
specifically, the complaint targeted the so-called ‘loyalty clause’ in SKFF by-laws that 
provided for fines and suspensions for the members (athletes, coaches, officials and judges) 
who participate in contests that are not sanctioned by the SKFF or IFBB. Swedish Competition 
Authority closed the investigation into this case after SKFF committed to amending the ‘loyalty 
clause’ and removing the threat of fining or sanctioning their members for participation in 
unsanctioned events.92 It can safely be assumed that had the decision been reached, it would 
have mirrored the outcome in the SBF v. KKV case.93 
 
7.2. Ireland: Show Jumping Ireland case 
  
In May 2012, Irish Competition and Consumer Protection Commission closed their 
investigation into Article 299N of the Show Jumping Ireland (SJI) Rulebook that prevented 
their members from competing at unaffiliated show jumping events where the prize fund 
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exceeded €50/£50.94 Any breach of this rule entailed penalties for members. ICCPC considered 
the rule likely breached Irish and EU competition law because it not only prevented SJI 
members from participating in unaffiliated events but it simultaneously prevented third parties 
from organising and hold such unaffiliated events. The SJI committed to amend the rule to 
address the competition concerns. Members of SJI who enter into unaffiliated show can now 
be penalized only if the show (i) has not signed up to the specified Health and Safety Standards; 
and, (ii) has not provided the SJI with evidence of adequate insurance.95  
Equivalent competition law decisions against restrictive clauses of national sports governing 
bodies could be seen in decisions of Italian96 and Finnish97 competition authorities.  
 
7.3. Belgium: Global Champions League case 
 
In July 2015 Global Champions League case,98 Belgian Competition Authority (BCA) 
examined a clause in the International Equestrian Federation (FEI, Federation Equestre 
Internationale) General Regulations according to which FEI had exclusive rights to accredit 
international equestrian competitions. To receive FEI accreditation organisers were required to 
wave intellectual property rights even when their events did not bear the FEI name, and to 
comply with all FEI rules, regulations and requirements even when their contests and series 
did not count towards the Official FEI classification99. The ‘exclusivity clause’ further included 
a six month suspension from FEI accredited events for athletes, horses, and officials, who 
participated in events and/or competitions not accredited by the FEI.100 The governing body 
claimed that the exclusivity clause was adopted in order to protect the welfare of horses and 
integrity of competitions.101 
When Global Champions League (GCL) applied for authorisation of a new league alongside 
its existing competitions, FEI declined to approve it mostly on the basis that its own Nations 
Cup series is sufficient to meet the demands of the sport and its participants. This reason for 
blocking the new GCL league is apparent from the transcripts of long negotiations that lasted 
for more than a year. It was clear that without FEI authorisation, the Global Champions League 
that was scheduled for April 2016, would not be organized and the project would have to be 
abandoned. GCL therefore applied to BCA for interim measures to suspend the application of 
the exclusivity clause. This request was held admissible and well-founded by BCA that ordered 
the FEI to suspend Articles 113(4)-(6) of the General Regulations with respect to the 
participation of athletes and horses in the Global Champions League until the final decision in 
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the case. Also, the FEI was to indicate unambiguously in its news section that “no athlete or 
horse may be suspended or sanctioned as a result of participating in a competition organized 
under the Global Champions League”.102 On 28 April 2016, the Brussels Court of Appeal 
refused the FEI request for annulment of the BCA interim measure. Instead, it confirmed its 
validity and also upheld BCA’s prima facie assessment of infringement of Belgian and EU 
competition laws.103 
While deciding on the temporary measure BAC doubted the real motivation behind the 
exclusivity clause and noted that the approval process lacked transparency and clarity which 
should have been the case given the conflict of interest between FEI regulatory and commercial 
functions, and that it was not based on the sporting aspect (because GCL already complied with 
all of them), not applied without any discrimination and not proportionate to the sporting 
objectives; pointed out that strict deadlines should also be implemented; noted that even if 
contest or series complied with all the rules and regulations of the FEI (as the Global 
Champions League did) the FEI could have refused to give its consent for arbitrary and 
commercial reasons in its sole discretion; and recognised that in 2012 and 2013 when the 
contested clause was introduced the FEI revenues immediately doubled. Consequently, BAC 
concluded that the FEI exclusivity clause prevents an independent organizer or promoter from 
accessing the ‘raw materials’ of equestrian sports (i.e., athletes, horses and officials) as no 
internationally competing athlete will participate in a non-accredited competition insofar as 
such participation prevents him/her from participating in all national and international 
competitions accredited by the FEI for six months. On the basis of these factors BAC concluded 
that the FEI approval process, applied in the context of the FEI exclusivity clause, allows the 
FEI to abuse its position as a sports regulator in order to promote its own commercial interests 
at the expense of alternative organizers and independent promoters, such as the Global 
Champions League.104  
 
7.4. Germany: Euroleague Basketball and NRWTV Triathlon cases 
 
Interim measures were also granted in June 2016 by the Munich Regional Court in Euroleague 
Basketball vs FIBA and FIBA Europe.105 The background of the dispute is interesting and 
procedurally unique. In February 2016 Euroleague Basketball filed a complaint on the basis of 
Article 102 TFEU before the EU Commission against FIBA and FIBA Europe for putting 
pressure on clubs, players and referees to force them to abandon the Euroleague and the 
Eurocup organised by Euroleague Commercial Assets (ECA) and only participate in FIBA 
competitions. National federations that took no steps to discipline their clubs and domestic 
leagues that participate in ECA competitions would lose their national team rights to participate 
in 2016 Rio Olympic Games and EuroBasket 2017 organised by the Respondents.106  
Two month later FIBA launched an equivalent counter-complaint before the EU Commission 
against ECA for breaches of Article 102 TFEU, referring to the legal action against itself and 
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FIBA Europe as a smokescreen intended to mask ECA’s own anti-competitive behaviour. 
Specifically, FIBA’s complaint related to abusive tying by ECA that imposed undue pressure 
on leagues and clubs and threatened them with exclusion from Euroleague unless they commit 
to Eurocup, like in the case of Adriatic League; the fact that all Euroleague and Eurocup 
decisions in sporting and commercial matters are controlled by six clubs; destroying any 
commercial and sporting value of domestic leagues and undermining the competitive balance 
in European basketball by arbitrarily cherry-picking clubs for Euroleague and Eurocup, and; 
abusively discriminating against financially weaker clubs, thereby placing them at a further 
competitive disadvantage. According to FIBA, ‘ECA wished to reap the benefits of the 
basketball ecosystem developed by national federations (players, coaches, referees, thousands 
of other clubs) without contributing to the foundations of the sport’s pyramid and holding the 
national teams hostage to serve the interests of six commercially powerful clubs.’107 
In May 2016, a group of Euroleague and Eurocup clubs, domestic leagues and Euroleague 
Basketball petitioned Munich Regional Court for interim relief in an attempt to avoid 
irreversible damage to national teams before the EU Commission can rule on the complaint by 
Euroleague Basketball.108 A temporary measure was granted on 2 June 2016. The judge in the 
case prohibited FIBA Europe and FIBA from sanctioning or threatening to sanction, directly 
or indirectly, the Applicants, the basketball clubs, National Basketball Federations, or national 
or supra-national basketball leagues in the geographic area of FIBA Europe because of their 
decision or intention to co-operate with ECA and its subsidiaries.109 
The EU Commission now has an option to open up formal investigation into this dispute(s), or 
to reject the complaint(s) on the basis of there being no sufficient EU interest.110 As far as 
predicting the outcome of potential investigation, both complaints have merits and if they can 
prove their allegations both FIBA and ECA would gain some and lose some. ECA would be 
forced to revamp the rules on access to their competitions (to become open, transparent and 
non-discriminatory), and release the clubs from obligation to play in both Euroleague and 
Eurocup. At the same time, FIBA would be required to remove the threat of sanctions against 
any of the parties taking part in ECA organised competitions. However, provided that FIBA 
can prove that the way the ECA competitions are organised jeopardises domestic leagues, and 
that the chosen sanctions are the least restrictive method capable of protecting domestic 
leagues, it is not inconceivable that it might prevail in both cases. Once that ECA removes its 
own alleged infringements, FIBA could no longer sanction any league, club or athlete 
cooperating with ECA on any level.   
The EU law approach towards clauses restricting the establishment or operation of rival 
competitions is clear. On the other hand, clarification of the acceptable way to organise an 
alternative sporting structure would be most welcome. The EU Commission will hopefully join 
the two cases and open the full investigation leading to a formal decision.111 
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 A less complicated scenario was presented in another German case.112 In April 2013, Higher 
Regional Court of Dusseldorf considered legal the fees that North Rhine-Westphalia Federation 
(NRWTV) was charging to private organisers of triathlon competitions in exchange for 
benefits, such as providing advertising space in their newsletter and website. The fact that the 
federation itself was active on the organisational market and had a conflict of interests in 
regulating and commercially exploiting the sport, and that there existed an actual restriction on 
competition, did not affect the outcome of the case. The fees charged in the case were not 
disproportionate to the actual benefits received. 113 Therefore, when private entity did not pay 
proportionate fees, the refusal by the NRWTV to authorise their event did not infringe EU and 
German competition laws on the abuse of dominant position.   
 
8. Conclusion 
 
A recent wave of cases discussed in this chapter illustrate the kind of assessment of restrictions 
on alternative organisers that will be carried out by the enforcers of EU competition law at both 
European and national level. Even though EU law refuses to be prescriptive as regards a 
structural model for European sports, it would be wrong to think that it cannot and will not 
force changes in those models indirectly via other routes. Cases such as SBF v. KKV show that 
inconsistency with the competition law of certain governing bodies’ rules leads to 
modifications that indirectly open up the previously non-existent possibilities in the 
organisational market. This in turn causes a change in the structure of that market. Indeed, there 
is no legally justified reason for the governing bodies to insist on being a single undertaking in 
a market for the organisational services or on being the owner of the commercial rights in all 
of the sporting events under their regulatory competence. Conversely, vertical pyramid 
structure of regulatory authority has a good chance of survival under the EU competition law, 
provided that the principle proportionality is respected. Even though there is a good degree of 
fluidity in application of the economic provisions in sports industry which requires case-by-
case approach, what makes a decisive difference in outcome of the cases is whether a specific 
regulatory rule protects public or private interests, and whether a ‘specificity of sport’ is 
involved. Those regulatory rules that serve private gains and do not benefit from the notion of 
‘specificity of sport’ will eliminate the possibility of passing Meca-Medina test. As a matter of 
law, such rules may nevertheless benefit from similar commercial ancillarity analysis, Article 
101(3) exemption and/or the equivalent economic efficiency defence under Article 102 TFEU.  
Sporting federations that maintain clauses in their rulebooks designed to block competing 
organisers will be forced to make necessary amendments and comply with the newly clarified 
legal environment, when and if challenged. The possibilities of entry into organisational market 
for potential competitors, as well as a possibility of expansion for the existing ones, must exist. 
This is bound to bring about a re-characterising of the business in the sports industry as it 
becomes more attractive for potential investors and opens more commercial opportunities for 
the actors within the sports industry. 
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